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SUMMARY 
 
 
CONCESSIONING OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUTER RAIL 
SUBSYSTEM 
 
 
This study investigates the concessioning of the commuter rail subsystem, which 
was discussed in the White Paper on National Transport Policy. The theoretical 
divide between private and public sector enterprise is investigated in terms of a 
principal-agent approach. The hypothesis underlying the fundamental shift of 
services traditionally provided by government enterprise to the private sector is 
X-efficiency gains under a concession regime. There are, however, potential 
challenges under a concession regime that must be anticipated. Challenges are 
identified in terms of an incomplete contract approach with its underpinning 
source manifested in a bounded rationality concept. The study investigates how 
rail concessionaires are regulated under a concession regime from an economics 
perspective and various price mechanisms are explored. The study provides 
strategies to deal with challenges under a rail concession regime with a view to 
minimising conflicts that will arise between the parties involved in a concession 
agreement. 
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